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LIST OF ALL PARTIES
The Attorney General's Office is represented by Robert
N. Parrish, Suzanne M. Dallimore, Stanley H. 01senf and David J.
Schwendiman.

They were opposed in the May 30th hearing before

Judge Boyd Bunnell by Utah Power and Light on behalf of
subpoenaed employees who were represented by Mr. Stephen Nebeker.
Several other Utah Power and Light employeesf Norm Maxfield,
Orrin Colby, Jr. and Karl Stott, were represented by Mr. Donald
B. Holbrook.

Emery Mining Company, although not permitted to

argue at the may 30th hearing, did present argument on September
12th as a party to the proceeding and was represented by Messrs.
Robert Reeder and Francis Wikstrom.
Mr. Max D. Wheeler, representing Michael C. Thompson,
Bruce A. Conklin, and Michael Ziemski, was also present at the
September 12th hearing as was Sumner J. Hatch, representing L.
Brent Fletcher.

Messrs. Thompson, Conklin, Ziemski and Fletcher

were not proper parties in the challenge to the Subpoena Powers
Act, however, for there was nothing pending concerning these
individuals at that time.

Judge Bunnell denied the motions filed

by them, holding that they would have to seek any remedy in
another court.

(Transcript of hearing, September 12, 1984, at

pp. 107-113, said transcript is hereinafter referred to as
since there are two hearing transcripts.
May 30, 1984 hearing is cited as "T-l").
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OP UTAH

IN THE MATTER OF A
CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION,

Case No. 20268

7th District Court No. CS-1
BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Is the Utah Subpoena Powers Act unconstitutional

because there is no automatic judicial review of each subpoena
once the court has authorized the investigation?
2.

Is the Subpoena Powers Act unconstitutional because

it does not require target and self-incrimination warnings?
3.

Is the Act unconstitutional because it is too

vague?
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES
United States Constitution, Amendment IV
The right of the people to be 3ecure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by
Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.

United states Constitutionr Amendment y
No person shall be held to answer for a
capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless
on a presentment or indictment of a Grand
Jury, except in cases arising in the land or
naval forces, or in the Militia, when in
actual service in time of War or public
danger; nor shall any person be subject for
the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy
of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in
any criminal case to be a witness against
himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor
shall private property be taken for public
use, without just compensation.
Utah Code Annotated, Sections 77-22-1 through 77-22-3
77-22-1. Declaration of necessity. It
is declared, as a matter of legislative
determination, that it is necessary to grant
subpoena powers in aid of criminal
investigations and to provide a method of
keeping information gained from
investigations secret both to protect the
innocent and to prevent criminal suspects
from having access to information prior to
prosecution and to clarify the power of the
attorney general and county attorneys to
grant immunity from prosecution to witnesses
whose testimony is essential to the proper
conduct of a criminal investigation or
prosecution*
77-22-2. Right to subpoena witnesses
and require production of evidence —
Contents of subpoena
Interrogation before
closed court. (1) In any matter involving
the investigation of a crime, the existence
of a crime or malfeasance in office or any
criminal conspiracy or activity, the attorney
general or any county attorney shall have the
right, upon application and approval of the
district court, for good cause shown, to
conduct an investigation in which the
prosecutor may subpoena witnesses, compel
their attendance and testimony under oath
before any certified court reporter, and
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require the production of books, papers,
documents, recordings and any other items
which constitute evidence or may be relevant
to the investigation in the judgment of the
attorney general or county attorney.
(2) The subpoena need not disclose the
names of possible defendants and need only
contain notification that the testimony of
the witness is sought in aid of criminal
investigation and state the time and place of
the examination, which may be conducted
anywhere within the jurisdiction of the
prosecutor issuing the subpoena, and inform
the party served that he is entitled to be
represented by counsel. Witness fees and
expenses shall be paid as in a civil action.
(3) The attorney general or any county
attorney may take written application to any
district court and the court may order that
interrogation of any witness shall be held in
secret; that such proceeding be secret; and
that the record of testimony be kept secret
unless and until the court for good cause
otherwise orders. The court may order
excluded from any investigative hearing or
proceeding any persons except the attorneys
representing the state and members of their
staffs, the court reporter and the attorney
for the witness.
77-22-3. Immunity granted to witness —
Refusal of witness to testify or produce
evidence — Powers granted prosecuting
attorneys in addition to other powers. In
any investigation or prosecution of a
criminal casef the attorney general and any
county attorney shall have the power to grant
transactional immunity from prosecu on to
any pc -on who is called or who is
tended
to be
lied as a witness in behalf f the
state
*never the attorney general r county
attor
deems that the testimony of such
perso:
necessary to the investigation or
prosecL
i of such a case. No prosecution
shall be - stituted against the person for
any crime aisclosed by his testimony which is
privileged under this action, provided that
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should the person testify falsely, nothing
herein contained shall be construed to
prevent prosecution for perjury.
If during the investigation or prosecution a person refuses to answer a question
or produce evidence of any kind on the ground
that he may be incriminated thereby, the
attorney issuing the subpoena may file a
request in writing with the district court in
which the examination is being conducted for
an order requiring that person to answer the
question or produce the evidence requested.
The court shall set a time for hearing and
order the person to appear before the court
to show cause, if any he has, why the
question should not be answered or the
evidence produced, and the court shall order
the question answered or the evidence
practiced unless it finds that to do so would
be clearly contrary to the public interest,
or could subject the witness to a criminal
prosecution in another juris-diction. If the
witness still refuses to answer or produce
the evidence, he shall be guilty of contempt
of court and punished accordingly. If the
witness complies with the order and he would
have been privileged to withhold the answer
given or the evidence produced by him except
for this section, that person shall not be
prosecuted or subjected to penalty or
forfeiture on account of any fact or act
concerning which, he was ordered to answer or
produce evidence except he may nevertheless
be prosecuted or subjected to penalty for any
perjury, false swearing or contempt committed
in answering, failing to answer, or for
producing or failing to produce any evidence
in accordance with the order.
The powers specified in this chapter are
in addition to any other powers granted to
the attorney general or county attorneys.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a final order of the Seventh
Judicial District Court ruling that Utah Code Annotated § 77-22-1
et seq. is unconstitutional and withdrawing judicial
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authorization for an investigation conducted by the Attorney
General's Office under the statute.

The decision was entered by

Judge Boyd Bunnell on September 20, 1984, after initially having
authorized the criminal investigation on January 26f 1983.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On January 26, 1983f Seventh District Court Judge Boyd
Bunnell authorized the Attorney General's office to conduct a
criminal investigation pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §77-22-1 et
seq., 1953 (as amended) (the "Act") (R. 8 ) . The Court reviewed
the Attorney Generalfs Affidavit of Good Cause and determined
that it met the Actfs required showing.

At that time, the Court

further ordered that the secrecy provision found in Xd. § 77-22-3
should apply.

(R. 4 ) . Following this grant of authority, the

Attorney General's office issued various subpoenas during 1983
and 1984, the majority of them directed to banks, state agencies,
Utah Power & Light and other documents repositories.

Sidney

Baucom, Harry Blundell, David Lloyd and the custodian of the
records at Utah Power and Light were each subpoenaed between
February of 1983 and March of 1984.

By arrangement with Mr.

Stephen Nebeker, counsel for Utah Power and Light, these
subpoenas were responded to with documents for the most part.
Darcy White, Jack Eliason, Norm Maxfield, Scott
Christensen, Dave Clement, Richard Riche, Orrin Colby and Karl
Stott, also of Utah Power and Light, were subpoenaed in March and
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April of 1984. Messrs. White, Eliason, Christensen and Clement
each appeared, with counsel, and were deposed in April.
Following their depositions, more documents were provided through
Mr. Nebeker.

Mr. Donald B. Holbrook represented Messrs.

Maxfield, Colby and Stott.
On April 7, 1984, however, the depositions of Norm
Maxfield, Orrin Colby and Karl Stott were postponed to April 24th
at the request of their attorneys.
postponed once more on April 24.

The depositions were

Finally, on May 14, 1984,

Messrs. Holbrook and Nebeker notified the State that they would
not produce Maxfield, Stott, and Colby for depositions.

On May

25, 1984, they filed motions to quash outstanding subpoenas duces
tecum and for protective orders.

(R. 57. 62). The Attorney

General1s Office filed a Request for Order Requiring Testimony
and Production of Documents at about the same time.

(R. 136).

On May 30, 1984, these motions were heard by Judge Bunnell in
Emery County and the court at that time held the Act
constitutional, but set forth guidelines to assure that it would
be applied constitutionally.

(R. 219). Following the hearing,

the Court directed counsel to attempt to agree on an order for
submission to the Court.
On June 7, 1984, the State agreed to stipulate that
Emery Mining Corp. could see pleadings before the court, except
the Affidavit of Good Cause.

(R. 233). On or about July 13,
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1984 Messrs. Holbrook and Nebeker filed Motions to Reconsider
with the courtf urging Judge Bunnell to hold the Act
unconstitutional.

(R. 255). Shortly thereafter, all outstanding

subpoenas issued under the Emery County investigative
authorization were withdrawn by the Attorney General's Office
except one to the custodian of records of Emery Mining
Corporation.
Meanwhile, counsel for all parties attempted to reach
an agreement concerning the Order of May 30.
able to do so.

They were never

The main disagreement arose from the wording

regarding the constitutionality of the Act.
Mr. Nebeker nevertheless submitted his version of the
Order to the court.

(R. 361). Soon thereafter, the State filed

a response to the motion for reconsideration.
On July 23, 1984, attorneys from the Attorney General's
Office and Messrs. Nebeker, Holbrook, and Wheeler stipulated that
the Secrecy Order then in effect should be modified to allow
counsel to exchange pleadings, motions, memoranda and other
materials related to such pleadings and motions.

(R. 342). The

Order was signed by Judge Bunnell on July 25.
On July 27, 1984, Mr. Nebeker filed a motion for an in
camera inspection of the Attorney General's Affidavit of Good
Cause and the supporting memorandum, along with a Motion in
Opposition to the Attorney General's Motion to Vacate the Order.
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(R. 345, 352). Mr. Holbrook filed similar motions on August 1,
1984 (R. 368).
On April 24, 1984, criminal charges were filed against
L. Brent Fletcher (represented by Sumner Hatch) and Michael
Thompson, Michael Ziemski, Bruce Conklin, and Patricia Thompson
Bowman (represented by Mr. Max Wheeler) in the Fifth Circuit
Court, Salt Lake Department.

(R. 400). The charges in that case

were in part based on evidence obtained under the Act.

Mr.

Fletcher filed a Motion to Join Various Motions of Other
Defendants in the Seventh Judicial District Court on or about
August 10, 1984 (R. 607) and Michael Thompson, Michael Ziemski,
Bruce Conklin, and Patricia Bowman collectively filed a Motion
for Protective Order and for Production on or about August 8,
1984.

(R. 383, 385). The Attorney Generalfs Office filed its

opposition to these motions on September 11.

(R. 707)

On August 21, 1984, Emery Mining, through Robert Reeder
and Francis Wikstrom, moved to quash the only outstanding
subpoena.

(R. 633). At the same time, they purported to join

all of the motions previously filed by Messrs. Holbrook and
Nebeker.
On September 12, 1984, a hearing was held before Judge
Bunnell in Emery County in which Messrs. Holbrook, Nebeker,
Wheeler, Hatch, and Wikstrom presented argument on behalf of
their respective clients. Judge Bunnell quashed the outstanding
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subpoena to Emery Mining, held that the individuals being
proceeded against in 5th Circuit Court were not entitled to the
remedy they sought, but were entitled to examine the affidavit of
good causer and took under advisement the issues as to the
constitutionality of the Act.

On September 20, 1984, Judge

Bunnell entered his Memorandum Decision Relative to
Constitutionality ruling that the Criminal Investigation Act (or
Subpoena Powers Act, U.C.A. § 77-22-1 et seq.) was
unconstitutional on the grounds that it was too vague and did not
give proper protection to individual citizens against violations
of their rights of due process and protection against selfincrimination.

He further held that the Act unconstitutionally

allowed for an absolute abuse of power without the benefit of
judicial review or control once the general subpoena power was
granted.

(R. 734).
Consequently, the Court dismissed the Criminal

Investigative Proceeding and dismissed the Investigative Subpoena
Power it previously granted to the State.

(R. 734).

SUMMARY QF ARGUMENTS
1.

Unlike a search warrant, the investigative subpoena

does not require judicial approval before being issued.

A

citizen has the opportunity to challenge its validity, through a
motion to quash, before compliance.

This opportunity justifies

less demanding standards than are found in the area of search and
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seizure and establishes the lack of requirement for prior
judicial approval of each subpoena.

These requirements were

established by the Supreme Court in Oklahoma Press Pub, Co. v.
Hfillinsr 327 U.S. 186 (1946):
1) The investigation must be for a
lawfully authorized purpose.
2) Documents sought must be relevant to
the inquiry. Probable cause to suspect the
commission of a crime is unnecessary.
3) The documents to be produced must be
adequately described and not unduly broad or
burdensome^.
If a citizen feels there is a violation of these standards in his
subpoena, he has access to the courts.

The remedy of quashal is

inherent in the judicial system and is entirely appropriate in
the absence of further legislative directive.

Because of the

existence of an effective remedy prior to compliance, the
Subpoena Powers Act does not allow for the "absolute abuse of
power" found by Judge Bunnell.
2.

Although the Subpoena Powers Act requires that a

witness be notified of his right to counsel, it is silent on the
subject of target and self-incrimination warnings.

Whether these

warnings should be required under the Act has never been decided
by this Court.

They were impliedf howeverr into the grand jury

setting in State v. Ruggeri, 19 Utah 2d 216, 429 P.2d 969 (1967),
which has led some to conclude that they may be implied by
analogy here.

On the other hand, the United States Supreme Court
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has never held that these warnings are required/ and in fact has
strongly suggested that they are not.
If these warnings are indeed required/ this Court has
the power to imply them into the Actf as it did in Ruggeri*
supra.

There is no reason to hold the Act unconstitutional even

if it lacks procedural protections.
If compliance with a particular subpoena would violate
a citizen's Fourth or Fifth Amendment rightsf the appropriate
remedy is quashal of the subpoena/ rather than a declaration that
the Act is unconstitutional.

Furthermore/ the mere possibility

that subpoenas may be issued which violate someone1s
constitutional rights is not a valid reason to hold the statute
invalid on its face.

If this reasoning were adopted/ arrest/

search/ and all other statutes that might conceivably be applied
in a manner such as to violate someone's constitutional rights
must be stricken as facially invalid.
3.

The Subpoena Powers Act does not violate the Fifth

Amendment right to due process.

Judqe Bunnell ruled the Act

unconstitutional partly on the basis that it was too vague.

It

is believed that what Judge Bunnell means by vagueness is a lack
of procedural protection rather than insufficient notice of
prohibited behavior/ the focus of most vagueness cases.
The Court also held that the Act was unconstitutional
because it contained no requirement that a citizen be informed of
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the nature and scope of the investigation.

While due process

frequently requires that a citizen be given notice, such is not
the case in the investigative setting.

Unlike trials,

investigations adjudicate no legal rights.

There is thus no

reason for a citizen to have notice of the nature and scope of
the investigation.

In factf providing such notice could have the

effect of impeding the investigation, since witnesses would know
what evidence to destroy or conceal.
Even targets do not need this knowledge to protect
their right against self-incrimination.

Since target and self-

incrimination warnings are not constitutionally mandated, and the
lack is not considered a violation of due process, there is no
reason to believe that the failure to require that even more
information be given to a witness who is not a target, is a due
process violation.
The most that could be required is notice of target
status and the charges upon which a citizen is being
investigated, as this Court held was required in Ruggeri, supra,
for grand jury witnesses.

This kind of notice, which falls far

short of the kind required by Judge Bunnell, is sufficient for
witnesses in investigations under the Subpoena Powers Act.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE SUBPOENA POWERS ACT MEETS ALL
CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENTS FOR THE ISSUANCE
OF INVESTIGATIVE SUBPOENAS AND THEREFORE
PROVIDES SUFFICIENT JUDICIAL REVIEW
The Attorney General's rights and duties in the
issuance of investigative subpoenas are set forth in § 77-22-2f
Utah Code Annotated, (1953) as amended.
(1) In any matter involving the
investigation of a crime, the existence of a
crime or malfeasance in office or any
criminal conspiracy or activity, the attorney
general or any county attorney shall have the
right, upon application and approval of the
district court, for good cause shown, to
conduct an investigation in which the
prosecutor may subpoena witnesses, compel
their attendance and testimony under oath
before any certified court reporter, and
require the production of books- papers,
documents, recordings and any other items
which constitute evidence or may be relevant
to the investigation in the judgment of the
attorney general or county attorney.
(2) The subpoena need not disclose the
names of possible defendants and need only
contain notification that the testimony of
the witness is sought in aid of criminal
investigation and state the time and place of
the examination, which may be conducted
anywhere within the jurisdiction of the
prosecutor issuing the subpoena, and inform
the party served that he is entitled to be
represented by counsel. Witness fees and
expenses shall be paid as in a civil action.
(3) The attorney general or any county
attorney may make written application to any
district court and the court may order that
interrogation of any witness shall be held in

-13-

secret; that such proceeding be secret; and
that the record of testimony be kept secret
unless and until the court for good cause
otherwise orders. The court may order
excluded from any investigative hearing or
proceeding any persons except the attorneys
representing the state and members of their
staffs, the court reporter and the attorney
for the witness.
The Act provides for judicial review at the outset of
the investigation by requiring the investigatory body to go
before a district court judge with an affidavit of good cause
detailing the need for an investigation.

If the judge determines

that good cause for the investigation existsf the investigatory
body may proceed to issue subpoenas to obtain relevant
information.
In spite of this initial requirement of judicial
intervention. Judge Bunnell held the Act unconstitutional
primarily because he felt it does not provide sufficient judicial
review.

It is curious that Judqe Bunnell reached this conclusion

after complaining that the Act caused "so much burden on the
Court to police it" in the hearing of May 30th (T. 1 at 48), but
he nevertheless thereafter maintained that he was concerned about
the lack of judicial review after the investigation was
authorized, which allowed "an absolute abuse of power."
page 4).

(Order,

By way of illustrating the alleged abuse. Judge Bunnell

offered examples of two subpoenas issued by the Attorney
General's Office, one which he felt was over broad, and one which
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he felt was beyond the scope of the investigation.

Judge Bunnell

apparently believed that additional guidelines and limitations on
the use of the subpoena power are necessary to insure that

there

would be no violations of a citizen1s constitutional rights.
Judge Bunnell did not elaborate as to the extent of
judicial review necessary, but he implied that review of each
subpoena would be warranted; less than that level of review could
hardly provide more protection than the present system, which
allows review whenever the respondent is dissatisfied with the
terms of the subpoena.

Even if Judge Bunnell felt that a lower

level of review would be adequate, the procedure he leans toward
is closer to that required for search warrants than it is to the
procedure required for investigative subpoenas.
It is important to compare, then, the procedures
involved for the search warrant and the subpoena and to determine
why differences exist in the constitutional requirements for
each.

To justify the intrusion of a search warrant, the

government must go before a judge and demonstrate that probable
cause exists prior to executing the warrant.
3, Utah Code Annotated, (1953) as amended.

See, e.g., § 77-23The investigative

subpoena, on the other hand, requires no individual approval once
the investigation has been approved by the judge after the good
cause showing.
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The difference in procedure has a rational basis, which
was explained by the court in Stanford Daily v. zurcher. 353
F.Supp. 124 (N.D.Cal. 1972):
A subpoena duces tecum . . . is much
less intrusive than a search warrant: the
police do not go rummaging through one's
homer office, or desk if armed with only a
subpoena. Andf perhaps equally important,
there is no opportunity to challenge the
search warrant, whereas one can always move
to quash the subpoena before producing the
sought after material.
A case very similar to the one at bar cites Stanford
Daily with approval, and goes further in establishing the error
of Judge Bunnell's ruling.

In State v. Tsavaris. 394 So. 2d 418

(Fla. 1981), a state's attorney served a subpoena duces tecum on
Dr. Tsavaris1 secretary seeking the doctor's records in
connection with a murder investigation.

Dr. Tsavaris moved to

suppress the records based on alleged violation of his fourth
amendment rights and he further alleged it was necessary that the
subpoena duces tecum be issued by a detached magistrate.

After

discussinq United States Supreme Court precedent, the Florida
Supreme Court stated simply:
The fourth amendment does not require
that a subpoena duces tecum be issued by a
detached magistrate as Tsavaris now suggests.
394 So. 2d at 426.

The court noted the difference between search

warrants and subpoenas duces tecum and the availability of a precompliance remedy in relation to the latter:
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Subpoenas duces tecum are different from
search warrants and are indisputably less
intrusive. While there is no opportunity to
challenge a search warrant, a subpoena duces
tecum is subject to a motion to quash prior
to the production of the requested materials.
Id. at 427.

See also In re Horowitz. 482 F.2d 72 (2d Cir. 1973)

cert, denied 414 U.S. 867 (1973); Fisher v. United States. 425
U.S. 391, 96 S.Ct. 1569, 48 L.Ed. 2d 39 (1976).
It is the opportunity to move the court to quash the
subpoena before compliance which provides the critical protection
against abuse or mistake.

The mandatory judicial review of the

search warrant thus finds its counterpart in the permissive
review, via a motion to quash, inherent in the investigative
subpoena process.

Moreover, the opportunity to challenge a

subpoena before compliance provides a person with greater
protection than the search warrant requirement.

La Fave, Search

and Seizure. § 4.13.
The only way an investigatory body could abuse its
power would be to remove a citizen's right to judicial review.
As long as this avenue remains open to a citizen, however, as it
has here, any attempts to circumvent constitutional rights will
be thwarted by the court upon motion.

As pointed out by the

court in Tsavaris. £A1E£3* if a witness appears in response to
defective process and fails to object before compliance he has
waived any right to object to the defects later.
425.
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394 So. 2d at

The procedure of seeking quashal or protective orders
was followed by those subpoenaed in the instant case.

The

allegedly defective subpoenas issued by the Attorney General's
Office were challenged prior to compliance and one was quashed.1
Even if it were the Attorney General's Offices' avowed purpose to
violate constitutional rightsr the most that it could do would be
to attempt to do so.

The citizen's ability to invoke the aid of

the court acts as an effective shield against abuse.
If an investigative subpoena is issued or executed in a
manner that does not allow re-compliance challenge, it might run
afoul of the Fourth Amendment.
(S.D.N.Y. 1976).

In re Nwamu. 421 F.Supp. 1361

This feature of the investigative subpoena was

discussed by the United States Supreme Court in the leading case
of Oklahoma Press Pub, Co, v. Walling,

327 U.S. 186 (1946),

recently cited with approval in Donovan v. Lone Steer Inc., 104
S.Ct 769 (1984)

In Donovan, the petitioner, who had been served

with a subpoena under the Fair Labor Standards Actf argued that
enforcement would subject them to inconvenience, expense, and
harassment.

The Court replied as follows:

1

Judge Bunnell implied in his Memorandum Decision Relative to
Constitutionality that the subpoenas withdrawn by the Attorney
General's Office when challenged were acknowledged to have been
abusive of constitutional rights. That implication is completely
improper, since the subpoenas were withdrawn because the
information requested was not needed at that time and was not
worth fighting over in court at that stage of the investigation.
Judge Bunnell did not rule that those subpoenas violated anyone's
constitutional rights.
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. . . There is no harassment when the
subpoena is issued and enforced according to
law. The Administrator is authorized to
enter and inspect, but the Act makes his
rights to do so subject in all cases to
judicial supervision. Persons from whom he
seeks relevant information are not required
to submit to his demands, if in any respect
it is unreasonable or overreaches the
authority Congress has given. To it they may
make "appropriate defense" surrounded by
every safeguard of judicial restraint.
Id. at 217
The opportunity to challenge a subpoena is inherent in
Utah's Act.

Indeed, the challenge to the constitutionality of

the Act arose in hearings regarding several motions to quash
subpoenas issued under the Act.

Citizens are thus clothed with

the protection of the court under the Subpoena Powers Act.
An opportunity to challenge the subpoena before
compliance justifies a less demanding standard than probable
cause. Hailing/ supjiar established the standards which govern
subpoenas issued by administrative agencies, grand juries,
prosecutors, and legislative committees.

La Pave, jSJiEJLa* § 4.13.

HLallina is also applicable to investigation conducted by the
Attorney General, since investigatory subpoenas are equated with
administrative subpoenas.

In re Investigation No, 2 of

Governor's Organized Crime Prevention Commission, 577 P.2d 414
(N. Mex. 1978).
In BLalLing, the Court framed the issue as one of
"balancing the public interest against private security" and held

that the "gist of the protection is the requirement that the
disclosures sought shall not be unreasonable."
The Court provided three guidelines discussing the
requirement of reasonableness:
1) No specific crime need be charged,
but the investigation must be for a lawfully
authorized purpose, within the power of
Congress to demand.
2) Probable cause to suspect the
commission of a crime is unnecessary. The
subpoena is valid if the documents sought are
relevant to the inquiry.
3) The requirement of the Fourth
Amendment warrant clause of a particular
description of the person or item to be
seized requires only that subpoenas contain a
specification of the documents to be produced
adequate, but not excessive, for the purposes
of the relevant inquiry.
Each of these requirements will be discussed at length
below.
1)

Authorized purpose of investigation
Grand juries have broad authority to issue subpoenas,

and judicial restrictions are minimal.

See, e.g., Blair v.

United States, 250 U.S. 273, 39 S.Ct. 468, 63 L.Ed. 979 (1919).
Administrative agencies have a similarly broad authority.

The

Supreme Court has sanctioned the broad investigatory power of
administrative agencies, equating agency powers with the powers

the Grand Jury, (which) . . • can
investigate merely on suspicion that the law
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is being violated, or even just because it
wants assurance that it is not. When
investigative and accusatory duties are
delegated by statute to an administrative
bodyf it . . • may take steps to inform
itself as to whether there is a probable
violation of the law
United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 70 S.Ct. 357, 94
L.Ed. 401 (1950).
This sanctioning of broad authority is reflected in our
own statute. which provides that
In any matter involving the
investigation of a crimeP the existence of a
crime or malfeasance in office or any
criminal conspiracy or activity, the attorney
general or any county attorney shall have the
right . . . to conduct an investigation . . .
S 77-22-2(1), Utah Code Ann., 1953 (as
amended) (emphasis added).
The only limitation existing in this statute is that crime or
malfeasance in office be investigated.

Therefore, unless a

citizen can show that the investigation concerned a purely civil
matter, it is extremely difficult to challenge the scope of an
investigation.

A party challenging the subpoena must make a

clear showing that the investigation is ultra vires or for an
illegitimate purpose.

See, e.g., in re Borden Co.. 75 F.Supp.

857 (N.D. 111. 1948).

In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum

Addressed to Certain Executive Officers of the M.G. Allen &
Assocs.. I n c . 391 F.Supp. 991 (D.R.I. 1975).
Judge Bunnell was apparently concerned that the
Attorney General's Office used its power improperly by using
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evidence obtained through criminal investigations for civil
purposes.

(See Memorandum Decision. R. 736, 737). He charged

that a civil anti-trust case filed in Salt Lake City was based at
least partially on information derived from the criminal
investigation.

The Attorney General's Office denied these

allegations in the September 12th hearing (T-2 at p. 94). and
agreed that it would refrain from using any information obtained
under the Act in that case or for any other civil purpose.
Judge Bunnell made these allegations and imposed this
duty upon the Attorney General's office without any showing that
the investigation was conducted for an illegitimate purpose, as
the case law requires.

It is also important to noter although

the point will not be belabored here, that there is no reason why
an absolute prohibition of the use of this kind of information
outside of the criminal case should be made.

Its use may

naturally be conditioned on the observance of appropriate secrecy
orders.
As long as the primary purpose of a subpoena is to
gather criminal evidence, civil evidence acquired along the way
need not be disregarded.
356 U.S. 677 (1958).

See United States v. Procter & Gamble.

The Supreme Court recently held in united

State Y, Sells Engineering! Inc.r 103 s.ct. 3133 (19R3) that
attorneys in the Civil Division of the Justice Department may
gain access to grand jury materials for use in civil suits if
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they obtained a court order authorizing such access after
establishing a "particularized need" for the materials.

2)

Relevancg
The second standard suggested in walling is the

requirement that the subpoenaed documents be relevant to the
inquiry.

Where the evidence sought by subpoena is not plainly

incompetent or irrelevant to any lawful purpose of the agency, it
is the duty of the court to order its production for
consideration by the agency.
317 U.S. 501 (1943).

Endicott Johnson Corp. v. Perkins,

The burden of proving relevance is simply a

showing that each general category of subpoenaed documents bears
some possible relationship to the investigation.

See In Re Grand

Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Addressed to Certain Executive Officers
fif-the Ht G. Allen & Associates,. Inc., 391 F.Supp. 991 (D.R.I.

1975)?

State Pept- of Revenue yt p t R, Johnson Lumber Q Q . , 617

P.2d 603 (Or. 1980)f Donovan v. Shaw. 668 F.2d 985 (8th Cir.
1982).

Anti-trust investigations typically require virtually no

showing of relevance, and broad sweeping subpoenas are enforced:
. . . because of the numerous and varied
activities which may constitute substantive
violations lof the antitrust laws] grand jury
investigations seeking to ascertain the
probable existence of such violations must be
given the broadest scope possible."

-EfeOjjIe^v^t^JloxXr 47 111. 2d 458, 265 N.E. 2d 601 (1970).
The focus of the t e s t of relevance i s not whether
irrelevant material may be seized, but whether relevant documents
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are subpoenaed.

See United States v. Acker, 325 F. Supp 857

(S.D.N.Y. 1971) .
The burden of proof cannot be made any higher, since an
investigation can only deal in possibilities of a suspected
violation.

The investigator generally has no knowledqe of the

contents of the documents.

The required showing must therefore

be "light, indeed very light."

In Re Grand Jury Subpoenas Duces

Tecum Addressed to Certain Officers of the M. G. Allen & Assocsf
IrXC., 391 F.Supp. 791 (D.R.I. 1975).
The relevancy requirement is incorporated into the Act.
§ 77-22-2(1) allows items "which constitute evidence or may be
relevant to the investigation."
3) The Adequate Specification Requirement
The third requirement elaborated in Walling is that the
subpoena contain "a specification of the documents to be produced
adequatef but not excessivef for the purposes of the relevant
inquiry."

This requirement has two prongs.

First, the subpoena

must contain a sufficiently definite description of the documents
so that a person can understand which documents must be produced.
Secondf the subpoena must not be so broad that compliance with
its terms is unduly burdensome,
340 P.2d 960 (Or. 1959).

pope & Talbot, inc. £, iJmithr

As with the relevancy requirement, the

burden of persuasion of establishing that a subpoena inadequately
specifies documents is on the party challenging the subpoena.
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In

Re Grand Jury Subpoenas Addressed to Certain Executive Officers
of the M. G. Allen & Assocs.. Inc. P sums*

It should be noted

that none of the respondents to this appeal cited any authority
nor made any showing to meet the burden set by the case law ,in
the lower court.
The first prong of the requirement, that the subpoena
contain a definite description- is easily met.

The courts

generally do not require greater specificity than is within the
knowledge of the investigative body.

In re Eastman Kodak £e., 7

F.R.D. 760 (W.D.N.Y 1947).
The second prong, that the subpoena cannot be unduly
broad or unburdensome, is frequently litigated.

The objections

are usually based on the quantity of documents demanded and the
period of time which the documents cover.

The courts consider

several factors to determine whether a subpoena is unduly broad
and burdensome.

First, the scope of the investigation

helps

determine the volume of documents that must be produced.

The

broader or more complex the investigation* the broader the
permissible scope of the subpoenas.
the

Second, the Courts consider

probability that the records will reveal evidence helpful to

the investigation.

Finally, the courts consider the financial or

economic burden that compliance would impose on the subpoenaed
party.

The larger the business enterprise, the greater the

volume of documents that may be subpoenaed.
££iziir£, § 4.13.
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La Fave. Search and

Judge Bunnell found that one subpoena served upon the
custodian of records of Emery Mining Company was too broad "in
any investigation of any criminal activity" (Order, page 2 ) .
Judqe Bunnell did not specify how the subpoena was overbroad nor
was any argument advanced by Emery Mining as to why the subpoena
failed to meet the standard, but it seems unlikely that a request
for employee records for a five year period would fail the above
test, considering the size of Emery Mining and the nature of
investigation involved.

The affidavit of Wayne L. Wickizer, (R.

5-8) which constituted the original showing of good cause to
conduct this investigationf mentioned "payoffs of U.P. & L. and
Emery Mining Co. personnel" and "Diversion of U.P. & L. funds for
the benefit of U.P. & L. and Emery Mining Co. officials".

The

personnel records would have been relevant in investigating these
allegations and the lower court erred in quashing the subpoena
without any showing of violation of the Fourth Amendment.

(Emery

Mining Co. did not contest the argument that the custodian of
their records could not assert a Fifth Amendment protection
concerning the subpoena duces tecum that was quashed (T-2 at p.
96).
Because of the inherent, and in this case frequently
used- protection provided by access to the courts, and the
limitations and guidelines expressed in the Act, the Act is
facially constitutional.

The fears expressed by Judge Bunnell

that insufficient judicial review exists are unfounded.
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It should be kept in mind that the Act provides the
same amount of judicial review that is given in our grand jury
statutef § 77-11-1 et seq., Utah Code Annotated, (1953) as
amended.

This level of judicial review is apparently sufficient

in the grand jury situation, which is similar to the process
under the Subpoena Powers Actr and offers no mane pre-compliance
protection of witnesses1 rights.
What Judqe Bunnell in effect ruled is that the
legislature may not authorize these kinds of investigations,
which necessarily permit a certain amount of discretion that the
courts will not automatically have the chance to review.

The

courts, however, do not have the authority to make such a
determination.

As the Supreme Court said in Hilling,

. . . to deny the validity of the orders
would be in effect to deny not only
Congress1s power to enact the provisions
sustaining them, but also its authority to
investigate violations of its own laws, if
not perhaps also its own power to make such
i nvesti gati ons.
Walling. £iipra, at 201.
POINT II
THE LACK OF EXPLICIT REQUIREMENTS THAT
TARGETS BE WARNED OF THEIR STATUS AND THEIR
FIFTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS DOES NOT RENDER THE
SUBPOENA POWERS ACT UNCONSTITUTIONAL
Section 77-22-2(3), Utah Code Annotated, (1953) as
amended, contains a list of information which must be given to
the witness:
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The subpoena need not disclose the names
of possible defendants and need only contain
notification that the testimony of the
witness is sought in aid of criminal
investigation and state the time and place of
the examinationr which may be conducted
anywhere within the jurisdiction of the
prosecutor issuing the subpoena, and inform
the party served that he is entitled to be
represented by counsel. Witness fees and
expenses shall be paid as in a civil action.
Although the Act requires that a witness be notified of his Sixth
Amendment right to counself it makes no mention of the Fifth
Amendment right against self-incrimination.

Judge Bunnell held

that the Act was unconstitutional because it did not protect
citizens from violations of this right.
There is no question that a witness may invoke his
Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination before a grand
jury or an investigatory body.
(1957).

See In Re Groban, 352 U.S. 330

This rule was applied to the states under the Fourteenth

Amendment in Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964) , where the
Supreme Court ruled that the prohibition applied before a oneperson grand jury.

Xd. at 11.

Whether the witness must be warned in advance of this
right in the investigatory setting- however, is not so clear.
There is no Utah case which discusses the issue, and the Act is
silent in this regard, requiring only that the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel be explicitly given.
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On the federal level, there appears to be no
requirement that a grand jury witness receive a Fifth Amendment
warning.

While the Supreme Court has not specifically addressed

the issue, this conclusion may be reached from an analysis of two
cases.

The first of these is United States v. Mandujano. 425

U.S. 564 (1976).

In Mandujano. the Supreme Court had to decide

whether Hixanda warnings must be given to a grand jury witness
who is called to testify about criminal activities in which he
may have been personally involved.

The Court concluded that

there was no requirement that the Miranda warning be given to a
witness appearing before a grand jury.
Court was based on two premises.

The reasoning of the

First, the Hiramla warning by

its nature is inapplicable to the grand jury process.

The

individual does not have an absolute right to remain silent.
Second, the court was unpersuaded that a grand jury hearing is
comparable to police interrogation.

The abuses that the Miranda

warning was aimed at curing do not occur in the grfend jury
setting.

Mandujano. however, cannot stand for the proposition

that no advice at all need be given, simply because advice was
given.
The second case, United States v. Wong, 431 U.S. 174,
97 S.Ct. 1823, 52 L.Ed. 2d (1977) helps to clarify the issue.
Hens, the Court ruled that a grand jury witness was properly
convicted of perjury even though, prior to her grand jury
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In

testimony, she was inadequately warned of her Fifth Amendment
privilege.

She did not understand enough English to comprehend

the warning.
The Wong case comes closer than any other to the
position that no warning need be given.

Yet even after Wong, the

Supreme Court refused to say that no warning need be given.

The

following statement came a short time later in United States v.
Washington. 431 U.S. 181 (1977):
. . . this Court has not decided that
the grand jury setting presents coercive
elements which compel witnesses to
incriminate themselves. Nor have we decided
whether any Fifth Amendment warnings whatever
are constitutionally required for grand jury
witnesses; moreover, we have no occasion to
decide these matters today . . .
Xd. at 186.
The Second and Sixth Circuit Courts, unlike the Supreme Court,
have expressly stated that the grand jury witness is not entitled
to be informed of his privilege against self-incrimination United
States v. Luxenberg, 374 F.2d 241 (7th Cir. 1967); United States
v- Cleary, 265 F.*2d 459 (2d Cir. 1959), cert, denied, 360 U.S.
936 (1959).
Although the Court in Washington refused to decide the
matter of Fifth Amendment warnings, it did address the issue of
whether a witness need be informed if he is a target.
reached the following conclusion:
Respondent points out that unlike one
subject to custodial interrogation, whose
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The Court

arrest should inform him only too clearly
that he is a potential criminal defendant a
grand jury witness may well be unaware that
he is targeted for possible prosecution.
While this may be so in some situations, it
is an overdrawn generalization. In any case,
events here clearly put respondent on notice
that he was a suspect in the motorcycle theft
•

• •

However, all of this is largely
irrelevant, since we do not understand what
constitutional disadvantage a failure to give
potential defendant warnings could possibly
inflict on a grand jury witness, whether or
not he has received other warnings. It is
firmly settled that the prospect of being
indicted does not entitle a witness to commit
perjury, and witnesses who are not grand jury
targets are protected from compulsory selfincrimination to the same extent as those who
are. Because target witness status neither
enlarges nor diminishes the constitutional
protection against compelled selfincrimination, potential defendant warnings
add nothing of value to protection of Fifth
Amendment rights.
13. at 188-189.
The circuit courts are split on the question of whether
target warnings must be given.

The Second Circuit, for example,

has affirmed the suppression of perjured grand jury testimony
because of the failure to warn the witness that he was a putative
defendant.

United States v. Jacobs. 547 F.2d 772 (2d Cir. 1976),

cert, dismissed, 436 U.S. 31 (1978).

The Third Circuit, on the

other hand, has declined to follow this line of thought.

United

States v. Crocker. 568 F.2d 1049 (3d Cir. 1977).
An approach taken by the Justice Department is to give
the warning despite the lack of a clear constitutional mandate.
See 9 United States Attorneys' Manual § 11-250.
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Both this Court and the Utah State Legislature,
howeverf have made it clear that target warnings are required, at
least with respect to State grand juries.

In State v. Ruggeri.

19 Utah 2d 216, 429 P.3d 969 (Utah 1967), this Court held that a
potential defendant, a target, called before a grand jury was
entitled to a warning of his Fifth Amendment privilege and to the
fact that he is a target.

He must be warned of the charcres on

which he is being investigated.
Justice Ellett required that these warnings be given
because of his determination that a target is an "accused" within
the meaning of the Constitution.

It follows that when the target

was detained in any significant way, he must be warned of his
status and of the charges being considered against him.

"To fail

to so warn one so being investigated is to entrap him and to
violate his constitutional privilege against self-incrimination."
Ruggeri. SU£I£,

at 973.

Although Justice Ellett correctly recited the law in
respect to custodial settings, his determination that a target
appearing before a grand jury was in custody was erroneous. As
the Supreme Court later clearly stated in Mandujano. jsiipxa,
. . .[The Miranda! warnings were aimed
at the evils seen by the Court as endemic to
police interrogation of a person in custody.
Miranda, addressed extrajudicial confession
or admission procured in a hostile,
unfamiliar environment which lacks procedural
safeguards. The decision expressly rested on
the privilege against compulsory self-
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incrimination the prescribed warnings sought
to negate the "compulsion" thought to be
inherent in police station interrogation.
But the Miranda court simply did not perceive
judicial inquiries and custodial
interrogations as equivalents: "iTlhe
compulsion to speak in the isolated setting
of the police station may well be greater
than in courts or other official
investigations/ where there are often
impartial observers to guard against
intimidation or trickery" 834 U.S., at 461.
Ruggerif thenf mandated strong protection of witnesses before the
grand jury on the false belief that they were constitutionally
required.

In spite of the intervening Mandujano decision which
made i t clear that no warnings were necessary in the grand jury
s e t t i n g , the Utah Legislature codified the Rugerri rule in 1980.
Section 77-11-3(2), Utah Code Ann. 1953 (as amended),
provides that a witness must be advised of his right to counsel,
but if he becomes a target, he shall be advised of that fact and
of the right against self-incrimination.

Utah case law and

statute thus provide a s i g n i f i c a n t l y greater amount of protection
than the federal rules for a target t e s t i f y i n g before a grand
jury.
Because t h i s Court and the l e g i s l a t u r e have given
witnesses the right to target and self-incrimination warnings in
the grand jury s e t t i n g , the same rights could be applied by
analogy to investigations under the Subpoena Powers Act.

Another

a l t e r n a t i v e , however, would be to give the self-incrimination
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warning only if the witness decided against the assistance of
counsel.

This is the approach the State of Washington has taken

for both grand jury and special inquiry investigations:
Any individual called to testify before
a grand jury or special inquiry judge,
whether as a witness or principal if not
represented by an attorney appearing with the
witness before the grand jury or special
inquiry judge, must be told of his privilege
against self-incrimination. Such an
individual has a right to representation by
an attorney to advise him of his rights,
obligations and duties before the grand jury
or special inquiry judge, and must be
informed o£ this right.
W.CA § 10.27.120.
Apparently, the framers of this statute felt that a witness would
be equally protected by a self-incrimination warning or
representation by counsel who would naturally warn him of this
right.

This kind of thinking may have been what our legislature

had in mind when they required only the right to counsel warning
on subpoenas issued under the Subpoena Powers Act.
Judge Bunnell ruled the Act unconstitutional in spite
of the fact that in the May 30th hearing, he held that the Act
would be given the presumption of constitutionality providing the
State Prosecutors inform witnesses whether or not they were
targets of the investigation.

The State agreed to do so, and

since the date of the ruling, has consistently complied with this
procedure.
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Implying t h i s procedure i n t o t h e Act should have
s e t t l e d the i s s u e of c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y .

I t surfaced a g a i n ,

however, in the Order of September 20th, when Judge Bunnell found
the Act t o be u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l , p a r t i a l l y on the b a s i s of the
l a c k of express standards on s e l f - i n c r i m i n a t i o n .

To i l l u s t r a t e

the perceived e v i l s which spring from the lack of an express
standard, Judge Bunnell d i s c u s s e d t h e S t a t e ' s handling of the
d e p o s i t i o n of L. Brent F l e t c h e r .

Fletcher was deposed in May of

1983, during t h e e a r l y s t a g e s of the i n v e s t i g a t i o n , and a f u l l
year prior t o Judge B u n n e l l ' s May 3 0 , 19 84 r u l i n g .

Fletcher was

not informed t h a t he was a t a r g e t , although he did have h i s
attorney with him.

Neither Fletcher nor h i s attorney a t any time

requested any warning or objected t o h i s g i v i n g testimony without
it.

(R. 5 0 8 - 5 0 9 ) .

Mr. Fletcher did d e c l i n e t o answer some

questions.
The Fletcher d e p o s i t i o n cannot be considered an example
of the S t a t e ' s a l l e g e d "abuse" of c i t i z e n ' s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l

rights

or as a v i o l a t i o n of the May 30th r u l i n g , s i n c e the d e p o s i t i o n
was taken prior t o that order.

I t i s i n t e r e s t i n g , then, that

Judge Bunnell should point t o t h a t p a r t i c u l a r i n c i d e n t as a cause
of the u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y d e c i s i o n when he had cured any a l l e g e d
problem by implying t h e necessary procedures i n t o the Act on May
30th.
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There are only two possible reasons which Judge Bunnell
thought justified reversal:

1) either he did not originally have

the authority to imply the procedures into the Act, or 2) the
possibility that the State may have violated the Order after it
was given (although the State knows of no such incident) making
the Act unconstitutional in its application (see Memorandum
Decision, R. 736-737).
It must be mentioned at the outset that the Court has a
duty to uphold the constitutionality of a statute if at all
possible.

Peck v. Dunn, 574 P.2d 367 (Utah 1978), cert, denied

98 S.Ct. 2822, 436 D.S. 927.

The presumption of

constitutionality of a statute transcends its destruction unless
the latter so obviously is obsessed with cupidity and unreason as
to have no substantial basis for its existence.

Norton v. Dept.

of Employment Security, 22 Utah 2d 24, 447 P.2d 907 (Utah 1968).
The purpose of the Act is to aid criminal investigators § 77-221, Utah Code Ann, 1953 (as amended).

It strengthens and enhances

the State1s ability to detect and eliminate criminal activity.
The Act is especially important in white-collar crime
investigations, where proof of criminal activity requires
examination of voluminous documents.
upheld.

The Act should therefore be

An easily corrected procedural problem, if it is found

to be a problem, should not be grounds for ruling the Act
unconstitutional.

The statute should be held valid unless there
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is clear, complete and unmistakable violation of some specific
provision of the constitution.

Sims v. Smith. 571 P.2d 586 (Utah

1977) .
With this strong presumption of constitutionality in
mind, it must next be asked whether a judge has the authority to
impose procedural requirements for application of a statute.
Although a court cannot supply omissions in a statute which are
of a substantive nature, £££, e.g.. In Re Barnettfs Estate. 275
P. 453 (Cal. 1929), it may supply procedures. While the power to
create substantive rights is a legislative power, the authority
to enact procedures to implement those rights is judicial.
Thomas v. State. 566 P.2d 630 (Alaska 1977).

The court not only

has the right, but also the duty, to supply necessary procedures
to implement legislative enactments.
529 (Okla. 1982).

Farris v. Cannon. 649 P.2d

See also fiydd v. State Bd. of Health. 451 P.2d

239 (Kan. 1969).
There is no question that Utah courts may imply
procedures as well.

State v. Ruageri. 19 Utah 2d 216, 429 P.2d

969 (Utah 1967) is an excellent example of a procedure being
implied into a statute.

In Ruggeri. this Court held, among other

things, that a person being in/ostigated by a grand jury must be
informed if he is a target.

The Court made that determination,

rather than finding the grand jury statu< ? unconstitutional
because of a lack of procedural requirements intended to
guarantee a witness1 constitutional rights.
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Judge Bunnell obviously had the authority to supply the
procedure of informing targets of their status if he felt it was
necessary to insure constitutional application of the Act.

This

is especially true when it is considered along with another rule
of construction, that the court has a duty to render an
interpretation
the public.

of the laws as will best promote protection of

Curtis v. Harmon Electronics, Inc., 575 P.2d 1044

(Utah 1978); £fcat£ Xx^Hnnit 13 Utah 2d 32, 368 P.2d 261 (1962).
The conclusion which must be drawn from these rules is
that if the target warning was indeed necessary to save the
constitutionality of the Actf Judge Bunnell acted correctly in
the first instance (i.e. in his May 30th ruling).

No reason

existed for him to reverse that decision.
If the judge had a change of heart because of some
perceived abuse of rights that the State initiated after the
ruling on May 30th, he did not mention where it was.

He did

mention, however, the concept of the Act being unconstitutional
as applied.
The problem with this reasoning is that the remedy for
a single violation of a witness1 Fifth Amendment right is, in
some appropriate circumstances, the suppression of evidence, not
a determination that the statute under which the violation took
place is unconstitutional.

£ae, e.g.. State v» Ruggeri, £ U B U «

The United States Supreme Court made the same point in In Ee
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GUQban, 352 U.S. 330 (1957).

Groban concerned the rights of

witnesses under an investigation conducted by a fire marshall.
The Supreme Court states that;
Possibility of improper exercise of
opportunity to examine is not in our judgment
a sound reason to set aside a State's
procedure for fire prevention. As in similar
situation, abuse may be corrected as they
arise, for example, by excluding from
subsequent prosecutions evidence improperly
obtained. Groban at 381.
Similarly,^ the remedy for the single violation of a
citizen's Fourth Amendment right is not a ruling that the Act
under which the violation occurred is unconstitutional.

Instead,

it is the suppression of evidence, if the violation is
substantial and not in good faith, § 77-35-12(g), Utah Rules of
Criminal Procedure.
Therefore, no matter what the reasoning behind Judqe
Bunnell's decision to hold the Act unconstitutional on Fifth
Amendment grounds, the decision was an inappropriate response to
the alleged problem.

Following Judge Bunnell's apparent

reasoning, search warrant statutes should also be invalidated
because they allow the possibility of disregard for Fourth
Amendment Rights. When faced with a similar problem concerning
in-custody interrogation, the United States Supreme Court in
Miranda v. Arizonar 384 U.S. 436 (1966) did not hesitate to
fashion procedural requirements for warning people of their Fifth
Amendment rights; the now-famous "Miranda warning".

Judqe

Bunnell's i n i t i a l ruling in t h i s case followed the same approach,
but h i s reversal of that ruling on September 20, 19 84 i s not
l o g i c a l l y or l e g a l l y supported.
POINT I I I
THE ACT DOES NOT VIOLATE A CITIZEN1S FIFTH
AMENDMENT RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW.
In his Memorandum Decision of September 20, 1984, Judge
Bunnell held that the Act is unconstitutional because it does not
give proper protection to individual citizens against violation
of their right to due process.

He stated that the Act was too

vague, and furthermore, that it did not allow a citizen to have
notice of the kind of investigation being conducted.
737).

(R. 736,

Although it is generally understood that vagueness is the

lack of sufficient notice, it is believed that Judge Bunnell
could not properly have referred to vagueness in this sense.
Rather, he felt that the Act was vague in that it contained
insufficient procedural protection (discussed in Points I and II,
SilEia).

Vagueness is an inappropriate way to characterize any

perceived problem with the statute.
The theory that a vague statute may violate due process
due to want of adequate notice has application only where there
is regulation or a sanction for conduct.

CAVCO Industries v.

Industrial Commission of Arizona, 631 p.2d 1087 (Ariz. 1981).
since the Act at issue is not concerned with sanctions, vagueness
is not properly an issue before the court.
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Judge Bunnell also held the Act unconstitutional
because i t did not require a witness to be given notice of tne
nature and scope of the investigation.

He perceived t h i s lack of

procedure as a v i o l a t i o n of a witness 1 right to due process of
law.

Judge Bunnell's concerns, however, are groundless.

The due

process requirements for investigations are s a t i s f i e d by the
Subpoena Powers Act,
Traditionally, the United States Supreme Court has held
that due process requires at minimum that a c i t i z e n be given
notice of the charges against him and an opportunity for a
hearing.
(1908).

See, e . g . , Twining v« New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 110-11
At the same time, however, the Courts have been

unwilling to hold that notice and a hearing are such essential
elements of due process that they are required in a l l
circumstances:
The very nature of due process negates
any concept of i n f l e x i b l e procedures
applicable to every imaginable s i t u a t i o n .

Cafeteria and Restaurant Workers Local 473 v« HcElroyr 367 u.s.
886, 895 (1961).

As one commentator pointed out, the Court has

continually insisted that the procedures needed to minimize error
and to reduce the dangers of arbitrary action to an acceptable
level vary "according to specific factual contexts."

Hannah v.

L&LSh&i 363 U.S. 420, 442 (1960), since "not all situations
calling for procedural safeguards call for the same kind of
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procedure."

Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972).

Tribe, American Constitutional Law, § 10-10 (1978).
what process is due in the investigative setting has
been addressed by the Supreme Court on several occasions.

The

Court recently discussed the issue of notice in S.E.C. v. Jerry
T. O'Brien. 104 S.Ct. 2720, (1984).

In O'Brien, the S.E.C.

issued subpoenas for financial records to third parties during
its investigation of respondents.
the third party subpoenas.

Respondents sought notice of

They argued that they had a due

process right to such notice in order to protect their own
rights.

The Court disagreed, however, holding that the Due

Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment is not implicated because
an administrative investigation adjudicates no legal rights:
The opinion of the Court in Hannah v.
Larche, 363 U.S. 420 (1960), leaves no doubt
that neither the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment nor the confrontation Clause
of the Sixth Amendment is offended when a
federal administrative agency, without
notifying a person under investigation, uses
its subpoena power to gather evidence adverse
to him. The Due Process Clause is not
implicated under such circumstances because
an administrative investigation adjudicates
no legal rights . . .

Q'Brien,

AUSI&F

at 2725.

Although O'Brien aeals primarily with notice to targets
when subpoenas are issued to third parties, the holding that due
process is not implicated in investigations because they
adjudicate no legal rights has broad application which covers the
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instant case.

Lower court o p i n i o n s share the Supreme Court's

holding that due process does not require an a d m i n i s t r a t i v e
agency t o provide subpoenaed w i t n e s s e s with n o t i c e of the purpose
and/or scope of an a d m i n i s t r a t i v e i n v e s t i g a t i o n .

Federal Savings

and Loan I n s , Corp, v . F i r s t National Development Corp.. 497
F.Supp. 724 (D.C. Tex. 1 9 8 0 ) .
u'Brien a l s o s t a t e d important p o l i c y
behind the lacK of a n o t i c e requirement.

considerations

Notice would

s u b s t a n t i a l l y aid t h e a b i l i t y of t a r g e t s who have something t o
hide t o impede l e g i t i m a t e i n v e s t i g a t i o n s .

I d . at p. 2730.

It

would a l s o have the e f f e c t of l a y i n g bare the i n v e s t i g a t i n g
a u t h o r i t y ' s knowledge and i n t e n t i o n s midway through the
investigation.
This opinion was echoed i n Pepsi Co, v. S . E . C . , 56 3
F.Supp. 828, 832 (S.D.N.Y. 1 9 8 3 ) .
TO impose a n o t i f i c a t i o n requirement on t h e
S.E.C. would n e c e s s a r i l y permit a l l
t a r g e t s — and presumably a l l p o t e n t i a l
t a r g e t s — e f f e c t i v e l y t o monitor the course
and conduct of agency i n v e s t i g a t i o n s .
Experience and common sense should e s t a b l i s h
t h a t such a power would be g r e a t l y abused.
The kind of n o t i f i c a t i o n d i s c u s s e d in O'Brien would be
much l e s s informative t o a t a r g e t than t h e more d e t a i l e d
requirement p r e v i o u s l y ordered by Judge Bunnell, y e t the Supreme
Court s t i l l found i t t o be a dangerous p o l i c y .

Judge B u n n e l l ' s

contention that a t a r g e t must know the nature and scope of an
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i n v e s t i g a t i o n t o p r o t e c t h i s own r i g h t s i s t h e r e f o r e i l l - f o u n d e d .
Such knowledge, i n the hands of a t a r g e t f would have the

effect

of emasculating t h e e n t i r e i n v e s t i g a t i o n .
I t i s a l s o important to compare Judge B u n n e l l ' s order
with what i s required under the S t a t e ' s grand jury s t a t u t e .

In

S t a t e v, Ruggeri, &U£X£, t h i s Court held that a t a r g e t must be
advised of the charges a g a i n s t him then under c o n s i d e r a t i o n .
Such knowledge adequately enabled a t a r g e t t o p r o t e c t h i s r i g h t s .
The Court did not require the grand jury t o reveal t h e scope and
nature of the i n v e s t i g a t i o n .

There i s no reason why, t h e n , in

t h i s s i m i l a r type of i n v e s t i g a t i o n , t h a t the Attorney General's
Office should d i s c l o s e such e x t e n s i v e information*

The advice

required under Ruggeri should be the most t h a t i s given in any
investigation.
judge Bunnell, however, went much further i n attempting
t o provide p r o t e c t i o n t o w i t n e s s e s i n the May 30th hearing by
requiring S t a t e prosecutors t o inform w i t n e s s e s of the nature of
the matter under i n v e s t i g a t i o n and of the scope of the
Investigation.

Since Judge Bunnell did not l i m i t t h i s

requirement t o t a r g e t s , i t presumably a p p l i e s t o n o n - t a r g e t s as
well.

Yet there i s no reason why a non-target in p a r t i c u l a r

would need t h i s information.

I t could, i n f a c t , cause problems

with secrecy p r o v i s i o n s (in a d d i t i o n t o impeding t h e
i n v e s t i g a t i o n ) because the information could be r e l e a s e d t o a
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potentially large group of witnesses which might include criminal
suspects or their accomplices, who have a motive to conceal or
destroy evidence of criminality.
£QNCLU£XQN
The Utah Subpoena Powers Act meets all constitutional
requirements for investigative subpoenas.

It is accompanied by

inherent judicial review which any witness may invoke if he feels
that the subpoena is invalid.
are

Any procedural requirements which

found to be lacking may be implied by the Court.
Because the Act is constitutional, and any defects it

may contain do not rise to a constitutional level, the Memorandum
Decision Relative to Constitutionality of September 2 0 , 1984,
holding the Act unconstitutional and withdrawing investigative
authority should be reversed by this Court and the Act should be
declared constitutional.

In addition, appellant requests a

reversal of Judge Bunnell's order quashing the subpoena to Emery
^

Mining Company.
DATED t h i s

li

day of

ftyiWAAM
.. 1985.
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DAVID L. WILKINSON
Attorney General
PAUL M. WARNER
Assistant Attorney General
Chief, Litigation Division

&Urf.P„2

ROBERT N. PARRISH
Assistant Attorney General
Litigation Division
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NLfcU
M THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
OF UTAH IN AND FOR EMERY CO.

SEP 21 1984
BRUCE C. FUNK,

By.
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR EMERY
STATE OF UTAH

IN THE MATTER OF
A CRIMINAL

INVESTIGATION

COUNTY,

MEMORANDUM DECISION
RELATIVE TO
CONSTITUTIONALITY

CS NO. 1
On September 1 2 , 1984, a hearing was held in this
Court pursuant to Notice on Motions submitted by parties
who were subject to subpoena under this Criminal
tion proceeding.

Investiga-

The Court ruled from the bench on most

Motions and took under advisement the challenge to the
constitutionality of the Act (77-22-1 et s e q . ) , authorizing
the investigative procedure being used as raised by several
of the parties for the first time in their own behalf and by
other parties on a Motion to reconsider.
The Court previously considered the constitutional
challenge to the Act at a hearing held on May 3 0 , 1 9 8 4 , and
the Court ruled at that time that the Court would give the
Act the presumption of constitutionality provided that in
its application the State Prosecutors comply with the following r e q u i r e m e n t s :
1. Witnesses subpoenaed pursuant to the
Act must be informed whether or not they are
targets of the investigation;
Recorded in Judgment Record
. -N
at Page . . ^ ? —

_ Clerk
.Deputy

2. Such witnesses must be informed of
the nature of the matter under investigation
and the scope of the i n v e s t i g a t i o n ;
3. Investigations conducted under the
authority of the Act must be limited to
criminal investigations within the parameters
of the initial good cause affidavit.
Since that ruling, the Court has had opportunity
to see the manner in which the Act has been applied and is
being applied and the way it can be used to violate the
personal

rights of the citizens of this state.
For i n s t a n c e , the subpoena duces tecum served

upon

Emery Mining Company commands that Company to produce:
"records which identify all o f f i c e r s ,
d i r e c t o r s , consultants and employees
(both union and n o n - u n i o n , professional
and m i n i n g ) of Emery Mining for the period
1979 to the present. Such shall include,
but not be limited to, names, a d d r e s s e s ,
telephone n u m b e r s , dates of employment
and employee n u m b e r s , if known. 11
Upon c h a l l e n g e , this Court ordered that general
subpoena suppressed as being too broad in any
of any criminal

investigation

activity.

A previous subpoena issued by the Attorney
Office attempted to get into Utah Power and Light

Generalfs

Company's

dealings in uranium m i n i n g , when in fact the original

Good

Cause Affidavit mentioned no indication of any criminal
ings in this area.

deal-

The State withdrew this subpoena when

challenged in this court.
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Another subpoena issued out of this

proceeding

was directed to a CPA firm and ordered the production
the

of

following:
"You are commanded to bring with you any and all
b o o k s , r e c o r d s , papers of any kind relating to
Mike Thompson and A s s o c i a t e s , G u a r d e x , A l a r m e x ,
Vanguard, Mike T h o m p s o n , i n d i v i d u a l l y ; Mike Z i e m s k i ,
i n d i v i d u a l l y ; Bruce C o n k l i n , i n d i v i d u a l l y ; Patsy
B o w m a n , i n d i v i d u a l l y ; and all other individuals
and/or entities associated therewith. 1 1

This subpoena was w i t h d r a w n by the State upon challenge in
this

Court.
The deposition of L. Brent Fletcher,taken

pursuant

to subpoena issued under this i n v e s t i g a t i v e p r o c e e d i n g , did
not comply with the requisites

that this Court feels must be

imposed to make the Act constituional

in its application

in

that the witness never was informed that he was a target,
nor as to the nature of the investigation

and, because of

the Secrecy O r d e r , he had no way of knowing w h e t h e r the m a t t e r
being inquired into was within the perimeter of the good
showing.

He was a l l o w e d , and did h a v e , his attorney

cause

present

with him during these p r o c e e d i n g s .
Some criminal charges have already been filed in Sal
Lake County based upon information obtained through this

proce

ing, and a civil a n t i - t r u s t case has been filed in Salt Lake
County, also as a result of some of the information derived fr
this i n v e s t i g a t i v e p r o c e e d i n g .

This i n v e s t i g a t i v e
-3-

proceeding

still open and being used for w h a t e v e r purposes the State
desires and solely within their discretion under the Act,
without limitation as to when a criminal

investigation

becomes a prosecution or controlling the ultimate use of
the findings for civil

purposes.

The Act has been abused and is subject to continued
abuse under its broad terms and provisions that set no limitations upon the State or any guidelines to the use of their
subpoena power.

The Court quite agrees with the Utah

Supreme

Court in its statement given in the case of In Re The Matter of
Nelda Boyer, 636 P2d 1085, wherein the Court states as f o l l o w s :
"When State action impinges on fundamental r i g h t s ,
due process requires standards which clearly
define the scope of permissable conduct so as
to avoid unwarranted intrusion on those rights."
This Court has, t h e r e f o r e , concluded that the Act
is too vague and does not give proper protection to individual
citizens against violation 'of their consti tuional right of
due process and protection against s e l f - i n c r i m i n a t i o n

and

allows for an absolute abuse of power without the benefit of
judicial

review or control once the general subpoena

is granted and finds the Act is u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l .

-4-

power

THEREFORE, the Court does hereby dismiss this
Criminal

Investigative Proceeding and strikes the Investigative

Subpoena Power heretofore granted to the State by this Court.
DATED t h i s ^ ^ ^ T d a y
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of September, 1984.
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